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IN PRAISE OF SOLON: ARISTOTLE ON CLASSICAL GREEK DEMOCRACY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Aristotle provides modern readers with one of the most detailed accounts of the origins and 
practice of democracy in classical Greece. He lived in Athens during most of his adult life (albeit 
as a metic or resident-alien who was not allowed to participate in its democracy) and thus 
provides us with a first-hand account of its 4th century democracy. Aristotle also is familiar with 
non-Athenian democracies, oligarchies, and monarchies based on his upbringing in a polis within 
Macedonian control.1 Aristotle’s school, the Lyceum, produced “constitutions”—political 
histories and analysis—of 158 Greek and non-Greek societies, of which the Athenian Constitution 
(AP) is the only surviving example.2 From an empirical perspective, Aristotle knew as much about 
classical Greek democracy—its varieties, its offices and institutions, and its practices—as anyone 
in the ancient world. As a general rule, contemporary historians and scholars who study ancient 
Greece commend the accuracy and sophistication of his observations on democracy.3 
 Aristotle’s observations about democracy survive predominantly in two rather different 
sources, the aforementioned Constitution of Athens and his Politics. The former is a history and 
 
1 For the geo-political context of Aristotle’s life, see B. Strauss, ‘On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian 
Democracy’, in C. Lord and D.K. O’Connor (eds), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political 
Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 229-231, and J. Ober, Political Dissent 
in Democratic Athens. Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998), pp. 290-295, 312-316, 347-51. 
2 Nicomachean Ethics (EN) 10.9.1181b7-9, Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, V.27.  
3 See A. Lintott, Aristotle’s Political Philosophy in its Historical Context (New York: Routledge, 
2018), pp. 9-10; P. Cartledge, Democracy. A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 14-
20; E. Robinson, The First Democracies. Early Popular Government outside Athens (Stuttgart: F. 
Steiner, 1997), pp. 35-44. Strauss, ‘On Aristotle’s Critique’, is a rare dissenting voice.  
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analysis of Athens’ political institutions, generally attributed to the “school of Aristotle” (namely, 
researchers in the Lyceum) rather than Aristotle himself, about which I will say more in Part II of 
my chapter.4 The Politics conveys Aristotle’s “political science” (πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη) or the 
knowledge of a statesman (πολιτικός).5 As its greatest 19th century commentator, W. Newman 
puts it, “The object of these books is rather a practical one, to teach statesmen how to frame, 
amend, and administer each constitution so that it may last.”6 Such political science is inherently 
evaluative: for Aristotle to call the political organization of a polis a “democracy” is a value-
judgement (and indeed, a negative value-judgement) about the political institutions of that 
polis.7 Although I agree with Cartledge that Aristotle’s evaluative framework is neither that of an 
“ideological democrat” nor that of an “ideological anti-democrat,” the “practical” orientation of 
his political science differs from that of an historian or even a modern-day political scientist.8  
 
4 See P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), pp. 58-63, and P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Constitution. Written in the School of Athens 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2017), pp. 1-6. 
5 See, for instance, Politics 1.3.1253b18-20, 1.10.1258a22, 7.2.1324b32, 4.1.1288b10-22; cf. EN 
1.2.1094b11. References without an abbreviated title refer to Aristotle’s Politics. Translations of 
the Politics are my own, based on W.D. Ross, Aristotelis Politica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 
but with guidance from C.D.C. Reeve, Aristotle Politics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).  
6 W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902), Vol 4, p. vii. See 
EN 2.2.1103b26-32, EN 10.9.1181b15; 4.1.1288b21-37. 
7 By contrast, M. Schofield, ‘Aristotle and the Democratization of Politics’, in B. Morison and K. 
Ierodiakonou (eds), Episteme, Etc. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 300, concludes that 
“Aristotle is a democrat—the sort of democrat with whom John Stuart Mill might have felt some 
affinity.” 
8 Cartledge, Democracy, p. 14. R. Mulgan, ‘Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy’, in D. 
Keyt and F. Miller (eds), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 
307-322, criticizes Aristotle for superimposing an a priori conceptual schemes (e.g., the parallel 
opposition of oligarchy and democracy, each with four species) upon the data of Greek political 
experience, but such schemes likely stem from Aristotle’s practical approach (a point made by R. 
Kraut, Aristotle. Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 446-451). 
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 My chapter explores Aristotle’s account of classical Greek democracy in three parts. The 
first part examines the notion of democracy “taxonomically,” namely as a kind of political 
organization that admits of a number of normatively ranked “species.” The second part provides 
an overview of Aristotle’s historical remarks on Athenian democracy and a more focused analysis 
of his account of the political reforms that Solon introduced to Athens in the early 6th C., a form 
of political organization that Aristotle characterizes as the “ancestral democracy” (δημοκρατίαν 
τὴν πάτριον).9 I argue that Aristotle judges Solon’s moderating political reforms—specifically, 
assigning to the δῆμος or “the people” the roles of electing and auditing (εὐθύναι) magistrates—
as a pre-eminent solution to the problem of democratic participation. Finally, in the third part of 
my chapter I examine Aristotle’s evaluation of democracy, especially “democratic justice” and 
the overlapping ways that he evaluates constitution-types. 
 
PART I: TAXONOMY—WHAT IS DEMOCRACY (FOR ARISTOTLE)? 
At the heart of Aristotle’s political science is the notion of πολιτεία in the sense of “constitution,” 
which he defines as “the organization of a city’s various offices, but particularly, of the one that 
has authority over everything.”10 Most of the social or political aspects of a polis are determined 
by the nature of its constitution: Aristotle claims that the idea of citizenship, the laws, the political 
 
9 2.12.1273b38. See further M.H. Hansen, ‘Solonian Democracy in Fourth-Century Athens’, 
Classica et Mediaevalia 40 (1989), 75-79. 
10 3.6.1278b8-10. See further 3.1.1274b32, 4.1.1289a15-22, 4.3.1290a5-12. For a survey of how 
Aristotle uses the term πολιτεία in the Politics, see J.J. Mulhern, ‘Politeia in Greek literature, 
inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics: Reflections on translation and interpretation’, in T. 
Lockwood and T. Samaras (eds), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp. 84-102.  
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offices, the education, and even the arrangements of the household and models of human 
excellence are “relative to the constitution.”11 Aristotle also recognizes that individual 
constitutions can be classified under at least six different constitution-types. Thus, for 
terminological clarity, although 4th century Athens has a democratic constitution, its constitution 
(written and unwritten) is an example of democracy as a constitution-type. Let me examine 
Aristotle’s distinction between correct and deviant constitution-types and the species of 
democracy (along with their democratic features).  
 
I.1: Correct and deviant constitution-types 
Aristotle states his taxonomy of constitution-types (of which democracy is an example) in several 
places.12 The most familiar aspect of Aristotle’s theory is his six-fold taxonomy (Table I) that 
characterizes constitution-types with respect to normative criterion (whether those in power rule 
in the common interest, and thus are “correct” [ὀρθαί] constitution-types, or in their own 
interest, in which case they are “deviations from correct constitutions” [παρεκβάσεις τῶν 
ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν]) and quantitative criterion (namely whether those in power are many, few, 
 
11 See, for instance: laws relative to the constitution (3.11.1282b10-11, 4.1.1289a17-25, 
4.5.1292b15); offices relative to the constitution (4.14.1298a9-32, 4.15.1299b30, 6.2.1317b17-
1318a3, 6.8.1323a1-9); education relative to the constitution (5.9.1309a12-14, a20, 
7.13.1332b5-10, 8.1.1337a11-15); virtue relative to the constitution (1.13.1260b12-25, 
3.4.1276b29, 5.9.1309a35-8). 
12 Aristotle often offers his own taxonomy in criticism of others: see 3.8.1279b16-1280a6, 
4.1.1289a8-10, 23-25, 4.3.1290a13-23, 4.4.1290a30-b7, 5.12.1316b25-26. For constitutional 
theory in Aristotle’s predecessors, see J. de Romilly, ‘La classement des constitutions d’Hérodote 
à Aristote’, Revue des Etudes Greques 72 (1959), 81–99.  
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or a single individual).13 But after Politics 3.6 initially distinguishes constitution-types on a 
quantitative basis, Politics 3.8 revises the taxonomy and bases it on qualitative or socio-economic 
Table I: Aristotle’s six-fold taxonomy of constitution-types (Politics 3.6) 
 Right constitutions (rule in the 
interest of the common benefit) 
Deviant constitutions (rule in the 
interest of the rulers) 
One person rules Kingship Tyranny 
Few people rule Oligarchy Aristocracy 
Many people rule Polity or constitutional republic Democracy 
 
categories such as whether the rich, the poor, or the middle-class rules.14 What truly 
distinguishes, e.g., democracy, oligarchy, of polity is whether the poor, the rich, or the middle-
class rule. Politics 4.8 refines the qualitative analysis slightly: democracy is not simply when a city 
is ruled by the poor, but “rather, it is a democracy when the free and the poor (οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ 
ἄποροι) who are a majority have the authority to rule, and an oligarchy when the rich and well 
born, who are few, do.”15 The “free” are just those native born men of a polis who claim the right 
to participate based solely on their citizenship claims. 
In addition to normative and qualitative criteria, Aristotle’s distinction between right and 
 
13 3.6.1279a17-21; cf. 4.2.1289a26-29. M.H. Hansen, ‘Aristotle’s Alternative to the Sixfold Model 
of Constitutions’, in his Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 
Press, 2013), pp. 1-17, calls into question whether Aristotle abandons the Sixfold taxonomy of 
Politics 3 when he examines their taxonomy in Politics 4-6. Although space does not allow a 
complete analysis of his arguments, D. Riesbeck, ‘The Unity of Aristotle’s Theory of Constitutions’, 
Apeiron 49 (2016), 93-125, supplies a persuasive response (which I support).  
14 3.8.1279b19-36, 4.4.1290a30-b6. 
15 4.4.1290b17-20, cf. 4.4.1290a36, 4.4.1290a36, 4.15.1299b27. Aristotle presents freedom as 
democracy’s defining mark (ὅρος [4.8.1294a10]) and underlying principle (ὑπόθεσις 
[6.2.1317b11, 6.4.1318b40). For the meaning of Aristotle’s terms, see F. Miller, Nature, Justice, 
and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 156-159. See further 
M.H. Hansen, ‘Democratic Freedom and the Concept of Freedom in Plato and Aristotle’, Greek, 
Roman, and Byzantine Studies 50 (2010), 1-27.  
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deviant constitution-types also does important work within his taxonomy. Politics 4.3 elucidates 
the model by juxtaposing two kinds of “deviation.” Some propose classifying constitutions like 
the winds: the most common winds are those that blow from the north and south, and the west 
wind is a “deviation” from the north insofar as both are warm winds, but the west wind is less 
common; according to such a model, democracy is the most common type of pluralistic 
constitution and polity is its more rare deviation.16 By contrast, Aristotle classifies constitution-
types like musical forms, in which too tight or too loose forms deviate from (or literally “fall away 
from” [παρ-εκ-βασις]) a well-blended harmony.17 Aristotle’s endorses the latter model because 
it captures the way that democracy, although more common, is a less well-blended form of 
pluralistic rule, one best understood insofar as it falls away from “polity.”18 Polity as a 
constitution-type mixes democratic and oligarchic elements and mitigates antagonism between 
the rich and the poor by the presence of a middle class that rules in the interest of the common 
good.19 By contrast, democracy (and oligarchy) are so common 
 
16 4.3.1290a13-19; see Meteorology 364a18-27.  
171290a22-29. Aristotle uses the language of “tightening” (e.g., ἐπιτείνω, τείνω) to describe 
more exclusive oligarchies (4.6.1293a26, a30, 6.6.1320b30, 5.9.1309b26, b33). 5.9 claims that 
deviant constitutions overlook the mean because they are “tightened” towards the extreme 
(5.9.1309b18-1310a2).  
18 For the frequency of democracy: 3.15.1286b19-22, 4.6.1293a1-3, 4.11.1296a21-37. Aristotle 
characterizes correct constitution-types as being “prior” to deviant ones (3.1.1274a37-b2); see 
further W.W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Aristotle on Prior and Posterior, Correct and Mistaken Constitutions’, 
in D. Keyt and F. Miller (eds), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 
pp. 226-237. To elucidate democracy, I simplify Aristotle’s account of polity, including its complex 
relationship to Aristotle’s “middle constitution.” For a more nuanced account of polity, see my 
‘Polity, Political Justice, and Political Mixing’, History of Political Thought 27 (2006), 207-22, and 
R. Balot, ‘The “mixed regime” in Aristotle’s Politics’, in T. Lockwood and T. Samaras (eds), 
Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 103-122. 
19 4.8.1293b31-33, 4.9.1294b13-15, 4.11.1295b1-13.  
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because the middle class in them is often small. Whichever of the other 
preponderates (whether the property owners or the people), those who overstep 
the middle way conduct the constitution to suit themselves, so that it becomes 
either a democracy or an oligarchy.20 
That democracy (or any deviant constitution) aims at the interest of the rulers is one aspect of its 
deviant status; but that democracy falls away from polity also constitutes the structure of 
democracy (as distinct from any other deviant constitution).  
 
I.2: The species of democracy and their democratic features 
Aristotle also claims that constitution-types can be subdivided into species (εἴδη) based on their 
parts and organization of offices. He writes that  
there must be several constitutions that differ in kind from one another, since 
these parts themselves also differ in kind. For a constitution is the organization of 
offices, and all constitutions distribute these either on the basis of the power of 
the participants, or on the basis of some sort of equality common to them (I mean, 
for example, of the poor or of the rich, or some equality common to both). 
Therefore, there must be as many constitutions as there are ways of organizing 
offices on the basis of the superiority and varieties of the parts.21 
 
By parts, Aristotle has in mind the various functional components of a political community, just 
like the parts that differentiate animal species.22 So, for instance, every polis includes persons 
 
20 4.11.1296a21-27; see further 3.15.1286b19-22, 4.11.1296a21-37. 
21 4.3.1290a5-13. Aristotle’s claim that constitution-types have sub-species appears to be made 
in criticism of Socrates (5.12.1316b25-26). 
22 Aristotle likens partite differentiation of constitutions and animals (4.4.1290b25-38). See 
further P. Pellegrin, ‘Parties de la cité, parties de la constitution’, in C. Natali (ed), Aristotle: 
Metaphysics and Practical Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Enrico Berti (Walpole: Éditions Peeters, 
2011), pp. 177-199; J. Inamura, ‘Scientific Classification and Essentialism in the Aristotelian 
Typology of Constitutions’, History of Political Thought 40 (2019), 196-218. 
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devoted to necessary tasks such as agriculture, artisanal labor, and trade/commerce; but the 
relative size and political incorporation of those sectors—which constitute a city’s “people” 
(δῆμος)—determine the quality of its democracy. Aristotle provides several overlapping accounts 
of the four different species of democracy (Table II).23  
Table II: Species of democracy 
Species of 
Democracy 
Sovereign part of the community  Institutional organization of the 
constitution 
Democracy I  Farmer class and class of those with 
moderate property are sovereign, 
but farming class participates rarely 
due to lack of leisure. 
Equality between rich and poor. 
Rule according to law. 
Offices open to all who meet minimal 
property qualifications. 
Democracy II Uncontested citizens have right to 
participate in assembly. 
Multitude lives by herding and thus 
are well suited to military service.  
Rule according to law. 
Offices open to all who meet minimal 
property qualifications. 
City lacks revenue to subsidize 
participation of the poor. 
Democracy III All free men have the right to 
participate but do so only when 
they have leisure. 
Multitude composed of artisans, 
merchants, and day laborers. 
Rule according to law. 
City lacks revenue to subsidize 
participation of the poor. 
Democracy IV 
or “final” kind 
(τελευταία)24 
Multitude of the poor are sovereign 
and rich do not take part in the 
assembly or courts. 
Rule according to the multitude 
rather than in accord with law. 
City’s revenue subsidizes the leisure 
and participation of all citizens. 
 
23 My analysis is based on 4.4.1291b30-1292a12, 4.6.1292b25-39a11, and 6.4.1318b6 ff. I believe 
that Aristotle identifies four species of democracy, but some scholars have interpreted him as 
identifying five (due to a manuscript variant). See further C.I. Papageorgiou, ‘Four or Five Types 
of Democracy in Aristotle?’ History of Political Thought 11 (1990), 1-8. 
24 4.6.1293a1, 6.4.1319b1-2. Although it goes beyond my chapter, scholars have speculated 
about whether Aristotle identifies Democracy IV with Athenian democracy. The most prominent 
feature of Democracy IV is demagogic manipulation, which seems more prominent in Periclean 
democracy (2.12.74a10-14, 4.4.1292a7-30, 6.4.1319b11-19), although Aristotle refers to 
demagogues “nowadays” (2.12.1274a9-11, 6.5.1320a4, a30; cf. 4.14.1298b13-15). See further 
Strauss, ‘Aristotle’s Critique of Democracy’, pp. 216-219; M. Canevaro and A. Esu, ‘Extreme 
Democracy and Mixed Constitution in Theory and Practice’, in C. Bearzot, M. Canevaro, T. 
Gargiulo, E. Poddighe (eds), Athenaion Politeiai ra storia, politica e sociologia: Aristotele e 
pseudo-Senofonte (Milan: Quaderni di Erga-Logoi, 2018), pp. 105-145. 
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Multitude composed of artisans, 
merchants, and day laborers. 
 
I will discuss Democracy I and IV further in the next two parts of my chapter, but it is worth noting 
that although Aristotle posits a categorical distinction between democracy and polity insofar as 
the rulers of the former benefit themselves and those in the later benefit the common good, the 
qualitative distinction between democracy and polity is more a matter of the degree to which 
the constitution mixes oligarchic and democratic elements. Democratic and oligarchic elements 
are present in polity but equally visible: its defining principle (ὅρος) is that you can “speak of the 
same constitution both as an oligarchy and as a democracy.”25 But all the species of democracy, 
except for Democracy IV, exhibit some “oligarchic” features (e.g., property qualifications for 
office, limits to the role of the assembly).  
 Although Aristotle thinks that constitutions are prior to other social-political aspects of a 
polis, he identifies “democratic features” (τὰ δημοτικά) that are defined from the democratic 
“principle” (ὑπόθεσις) of freedom and the democratic notion of equality.26 He identifies ten 
institutional features that can be characterized as “democratic,” namely: 
[1] Having all choose officials from all. 
[2] Having all rule each and each in turn rule all. 
[3] Having all offices, or all that do not require experience or skill, filled by lot. 
[4] Having no or only a low property requirement for running for office. 
[5] Having no office (aside from that of general) held more than once by the same 
person. 
[6] Having all or most office be short term. 
[7] Having all, or bodies selected from all, decide all judicial cases, especially those 
of inspecting officials. 
[8] Having the assembly have authority over everything (or everything that 
 
25 4.1294b15-16, 18. Aristotle identifies Sparta as an example (4.7.1293b14-18, 4.8.1294b18-34).  
26 6.2.1317a40-b17. On the “underlying principle” of democracy, see n. 15 supra.  
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matters). 
[9] Having pay provided for everyone for service in the assembly, courts, and 
magistrates. 
[10] Having no office be permanent.27  
 
Although democracies (and oligarchies) are differentiated by their parts, they are also 
differentiated by the presence of democratic and oligarchic “features.” The crucial difference 
between Democracy IV and other species, for example, is the presence of feature [9], namely the 
subsidization of political participation for the poor. 
 
PART II: HISTORIA—THE NATURE OF ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 
In addition to being an analyst of Greek democracy, Aristotle (and perhaps his school) provide 
historical information about the nature of Athenian democracy. As noted in Part I.2 of my 
chapter, scholars debate whether Aristotle identified Athens (and if so, which Athens) with 
Democracy IV. Although Aristotle is deeply critical of some moments in Athenian democracy (e.g., 
during Periclean Athens), there are other moments (e.g., during Solonian Athens) that Aristotle 
finds praiseworthy. Let me examine that history generally in the Athenian Constitution and the 
Politics, and then more narrowly in his account of the Solonian “ancestral democracy.”  
 
II.1: Athenian democracy in the Athenian Constitution and the Politics 
The Athenian Constitution is organized into two parts: (1) A linear historical chronicle from the 
7th to the 4th C. that chronicles eleven different changes (μεταβολή) to the Athenian Constitution 
 
27 6.2.1317b17-1318a3. Aristotle also discusses democratic offices (4.14.1298a9-32, 
4.16.1301a10-15, 6.5.1320a4-16, 6.7.1321a10-15, 6.8.1323a1-4) and democratic military 
branches (6.7.1321a5-20; cf. 4.3.1289b30-33, 4.14.1293b16-29). 
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(Ch. 1-41) and (2) an analysis of the council, magistrates, and jury courts of Athenian democracy 
in the mid-4th C. (Ch. 42-69).28 By contrast, although the Politics mentions the Athenian 
democracy approximately twenty times, many are, as Lintott notes, “little more than references, 
which today would be footnotes.”29 Nonetheless, there are three discussions in the Politics that 
provide substantive accounts of features of Athenian democracy that are far more than 
footnotes: Aristotle’s account of the democratic notion of citizenship in Politics 3.1, the critique 
of Athenian ostracism in Politics 3.14, and his analysis of the Solonian Constitution in Politics 2.12. 
As Schofield notes, Aristotle “conceptualize(s) the whole domain of politics in terms he himself 
explicitly acknowledges as democratic.”30 
 The third book of the Politics notes that a polis is a multitude of citizens and thus seeks a 
definition of citizenship; but within Aristotle’s framework, any notion of citizenship is embedded 
within a constitution, namely what it means to be a citizen is what it means to be a citizen in an 
oligarchy or a democracy.31 Aristotle’s analysis of citizenship is ambivalent: On the one hand, he 
recognizes that the most capacious notion of citizenship—which he identifies as “someone who 
is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office”—is above all the notion of a citizen in 
a democracy. On the other hand, Aristotle is critical of Cleisthenes’ expansion of citizenship in 
507 BCE, the Periclean citizenship law of 451 BCE (which defined citizenship solely with respect 
to descent from maternal and paternal citizens), and in general, the practice within extreme 
 
28 Rhodes, The Athenian Constitution, pp. 8-21, provides an overview of AP. 
29 Lintott, Aristotle’s Political Philosophy, p. 9.  
30 Schofield, ‘Democratization of Politics’, p. 286.  
31 3.1.1274b41; cf. 3.1.1275a2-5, 3.1.1275b5-6.  
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democracies of opening citizenship to “vulgar craftsman” (οἱ βάναυσοι).32  
 One finds similar ambivalence in Aristotle’s analysis of the practice of ostracism, namely 
the vote to banish a citizen for a fixed term without loss of citizenship rights or property, which 
Cleisthenes introduced in the early 5th C.33 On the one hand, Aristotle offers a qualified 
endorsement of the egalitarianism that seeks to remove a community member of outstanding 
power (he likens such an overwhelmingly powerful person to the painting of an animal with a 
disproportionately large foot or a chorus with a disproportionately gifted singer). On the other 
hand, he notes that ostracism in deviant constitutions is usually practiced for private benefit and 
that in the case of the best constitution, a person of such overwhelmingly superior virtue should 
not be ostracized, but instead everyone should “obey such a person gladly, so that those like him 
will be permanent kings in their cities.”34 The justice of egalitarianism is at odds with the justice 
of excellence, especially in the case of extraordinary excellence.  
 
II.2: A Test-case: Aristotle’s view of the Solonian Constitution 
Overlap between the Politics and the Athenian Constitution invites exegetical comparisons.35 
 
32 Democratic definition of citizenship: 3.1.1275b17-19, 3.1.1275b3-4. Criticism of Periclean, 
Cleisthenic, and banaustic notions of citizenship: 3.2.1275b21-22, 3.2.1275b33-36, 3.5.1277b35, 
3.5.1278a6-11. 
33 AP 22.1-3. On the practice of ostracism, see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, pp. 5, 35.  
34 3.13.1284b32-34. Qualified endorsement of the democratic egalitarianism: 3.13.1284b8-12; 
criticism of ostracism in deviant constitutions: 3.14.1284b4-5.  
35 On the relationship between AP and the Politics, see L. Bertelli, ‘The Athenaion Politeia and 
Aristotle’s Political Theory’, in C. Bearzot, M. Canevaro, T. Gargiulo, E. Poddighe (eds), Athenaion 
Politeiai ra storia, politica e sociologia: Aristotele e pseudo-Senofonte (Milan: Quaderni di Erga-
Logoi, 2018), pp. 71-86 (which focuses on the account of μεταβολή in each), and Ober, Political 
Dissent, pp. 352-363. 
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Most intriguing for my chapter are the ways that the Politics and the Athenian Constitution depict 
the Solonian constitution, namely the social and political reforms that Solon established in the 
early 6th C. BCE. The Constitution of Athens depicts Solon as a transitional figure between 
oligarchic and tyrannical rule who faced the predicament that “the majority were the slaves of 
the few, and the people (δῆμος) opposed the notables” due to the debt bondage that poor 
citizen-farmers had accrued on their own persons.36 The Athenian Constitution records Solon’s 
reforms and notes that they amounted to a revolutionary new constitution: Both loans on a 
person and the outstanding debt were eliminated (the so-called seisachtheia, which AP explicitly 
notes was a democratic reform) and Athenian citizens were divided into four property classes, 
the lowest of which—“day-laborers” (θῆτα)—were ineligible to hold office but could participate 
in the assembly and the law courts.37 The Constitution of Athens adduces selections from Solon’s 
poetry in order to characterize his constitution more generally, including his claim that 
I gave the demos as much prerogative (γέρας) as would suffice 
Not distracting from its honour or reaching out for it; 
While, as for those who had power and were admired for their possessions, 
I pronounced to them also that they should have nothing unseemly. 
I stood holding my stout buckler against both, 
And did not allow either an unjust victory (νικᾶν...ἀδίκως).38  
 
The Solon of the Athenian Constitution provides a revolutionary solution that fails to satisfy either 
the rich or the poor (and in its immediate aftermath led to turmoil, including years in which no 
Archon was elected due to stasis).39 
 
36 AP 5.1. Translations of AP derive from Rhodes, The Athenian Constitution.  
37 AP 7.1, 9.1, 7.3-4; cf. 2.12.1274a16-23. 
38 AP 12.1, Rhodes trans. 
39 AP 11.2, 13.1.  
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 The second book of Aristotle’s Politics is devoted to the analysis of those constitutions, 
either existing or theoretical, that are thought to be superlatively good.40 Within such a 
framework, Politics 2.12 provides an account of the Solonian Constitution that is evaluative and 
far less detailed than that found in the Athenian Constitution. Indeed, the main question of 
Politics 2.12 is whether one should think of Solon as an excellent lawgiver 
(νομοθέτην...σπουδαῖον) or rather as the first (mis)step on the path to Democracy IV. The 
passage is an extended debate: On the one hand, some suppose (ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται) that Solon is 
an excellent lawgiver because he ended the slavery of the demos and established a well-mixed 
ancestral democracy (δημοκρατίαν τὴν πάτριον), with an oligarchic council (the Areopagus), 
aristocratic election of magistrates, and democratic courts.41 On the other hand, others claim 
that by making the law courts open to all and selected by, he empowered the demos such that 
“those who flattered the common people like a tyrant changed the constitution to the democracy 
we have now”; on this account, Solon’s empowerment of the demos brought about Democracy 
IV in Athens with Cleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Pericles playing minor roles.42 
 Ultimately, Politics 2.12 sides with those who praise Solon. Aristotle notes that Athenian 
naval supremacy in the 5th century radically empowered the people (all of whom could serve in 
the triremes, regardless of their wealth) and produced radical Periclean democracy, an 
 
40 2.1.1260b29-31. See further T. Lockwood, ‘Politics II: Political Critique, Political Theorizing, 
Political Innovation’, in T. Lockwood and T. Samaras (eds), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 64-83. 
41 2.12.1273b35-41; cf. 5.6.1305a29. Politics 2.12 is Aristotle’s sole discussion of Athenian 
ancestral democracy.  
42 2.12.1274a9-11. Cleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Pericles in fact play minor roles in Aristotle’s 
Politics: Cleisthenes he mentions twice (2.12.1275b36, 6.4.1319b21), and Ephialtes and Pericles 
only once (2.12.1274a8-9; but cf. EN 6.5.1140b8-10). 
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unintended consequence of Solon’s reforms.43 Rather,  
Solon seems to have given the people only the minimum power necessary, that of 
electing and inspecting (εὐθύνειν) officials (since if they did not even have 
authority in these, the people would have been enslaved and hostile). But he drew 
all the officials from among the notables and rich…the fourth class, the thetes, did 
not participate in any office.44  
 
The Politics absolves Solon of the claim that his constitution led to demagoguery. Both the 
Athenian Constitution and the Politics note Solon’s four-fold property class, but whereas the 
Athenian Constitution adduces that detail to show the change in the constitution, the Politics 
adduces it to justify the practical claim that Solon’s reforms were moderate rather than extreme. 
 As Melissa Lane notes, Aristotle makes the case that “the plethos or popular demos can 
safely be made kurios in relation to the archai by controlling the most important ones through 
election and inspection.”45 The exercise of εὐθύναι—inspection, auditing, literally 
“straightening”—consisted in the annual review, by judicial courts, of the acts and financial 
accounts of members of the council or other magistrates, and as Hansen notes, even of “envoys, 
priests, trierarchs, and members of the Areopagus.”46 Aristotle not only attributes the creation 
of the office as Solon’s way of enfranchising the poor, but he also praises the office as a form of 
 
43 2.1274a12-15. See further 4.4.1291b24, 5.4.1304a17-24, 6.7.1321a13, 7.6.1327a40; cf. 
3.141284a39, 5.3.1303a8, 5.7.1307b22-25.  
44 2.12.1274a15-19, 21. Hansen, ‘Solonian Democracy’, pp. 95-96, notes that the claim that Solon 
empowered the demos to elect and audit magistrates is found only in the Politics and Isocrates. 
45 M. Lane, ‘Popular Sovereignty as Control of Office-Holders’, in R. Bourke and Q. Skinner (eds), 
Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 
66. Although I arrived at my opinions about Aristotle’s view of Solon independent of Lane’s 
chapter, we share a number of the same conclusions.  
46 M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 222; see further pp. 222-224. See also 4.14.1298a6-25, 1298b6, 
4.16.1300b19, 6.2.1317b27, 6.8.1322b11, AP 48.4-5, 54.2. 
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“best practice” in Democracy I: 
It is both beneficial and customary for all the citizens to elect and inspect officials 
and sit on juries, but for the holders of the most important offices to be elected 
from those with a certain amount of assessed property…or alternatively for 
officials not to be elected on the basis of property assessment at all, but on the 
basis of ability. People governed in this way are necessarily governed well; the 
offices will always be in the hands of the best, while the people will consent and 
will not envy the decent; and this organization is necessarily satisfactory to the 
decent and reputable people, since they will not be ruled by their inferiors, and 
will rule justly because the others have authority over the inspection of officials.47  
 
Lest one think that Aristotle is simply placating the demos, his account of the superiority of 
collective judgment in Politics 3.11—about which political theorists have written at great 
length—is the basis for his praise of inspection. Politics 3.11 notes that both allowing members 
of the multitude to hold office and disenfranchising them are problematic. He concludes that 
the remaining alternative, then, is to have them participate in deliberation and 
judgment (βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν), which is precisely why Solon and some other 
legislators arrange to have them elect and inspect officials, but prevent them from 
holding office alone.48  
 
Inspection takes the form of a jury evaluating the actions and accounts of a magistrate rather 
than the form of an assembly publicly deliberating upon a matter of technical expertise (for 
instance, whether it should pursue a specific naval strategy in an engagement with a specific 
enemy). Allowing juries to exercise such oversight is not only epistemically superior to having a 
single individual do so, it also insures the inclusion of the people into the political process in a 
way that takes advantage of their deliberative excellence. The Politics highlights the practice of 
 
47 6.4.1318b27-38; for the claim that inspection enfranchises the poor, see 2.12.1274a17, 
3.11.1281b33.  
48 3.11.1281b31-34. See further Schofield, ‘Democratization of politics’, pp. 292-299, and Lane, 
‘Popular Sovereignty’, pp. 59-62. 
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election and inspection as one of Solon’s greatest contributions to “democratic” theory. 
 
PART III: EVALUATION—THE JUSTICE AND STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY 
One can distinguish at least three different evaluative frameworks in the Politics: that of partisan 
conceptions of justice, that of the common good or the concept of justice in general, and that of 
stability.49  
 
III.1 The democratic conception of justice 
Politics 3.9-13 is a dialogical examination of the defining marks (ὅροι) and conceptions of justice 
within different constitution-types, most prominently what Aristotle calls “oligarchic and 
democratic justice.” Calling a conception of justice “democratic” or “oligarchic” appears to mean 
two things: First, that such a conception specifies the arrangements of participation and offices 
within its constitution-type.50 Secondly, that “partisans” within a city advocate inclusion and 
exclusion based on their conception of justice. As Aristotle puts it initially,  
All grasp justice of a sort, but they go only to a certain point and do not discuss 
the whole of what is just in the most authoritative sense. For example, justice 
seems to be equality, and it is, but not for everyone, only for equals. Justice also 
seems to be inequality, since indeed it is, but not for everyone, only for unequals.51  
 
The later position—that justice is inequality—Aristotle elsewhere identifies as the oligarchic 
 
49 “Justice” can describe the characteristic of a person or an institutional arrangement whereas 
Aristotle distinguishes between δικαιοσύνη (the human virtue of justice) and δίκαιον (the 
concept of justice). See further E. Schütrumpf, ‘Little to do with justice: Aristotle on distributing 
political power’, in T. Lockwood and T. Samaras (eds), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 163-183.  
50 6.2.1317b1-16 characterizes such a principle as a “hypothesis”; see note 15 supra.  
51 3.9.1280a10-13; cf. 5.1.1301a25-30, 6.3.1318a16-26 
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conception  according to which justice consists in excluding from political participation those who 
possess less property within a city.52 Thus, oligarchic constitutions establish property 
qualifications that limit participation in the assembly or the various offices of the magistrates to 
the wealthy.53 The former position—that justice is equality—is the democratic conception 
according to which justice consists in including in political participation all free-born men in a city, 
without reference to wealth, lineage, or virtue. Thus, democratic constitutions abolish property 
qualifications not only for participation in the assembly, but for all offices. 
 Problems arise in the form of στάσις—“faction” or civil unrest—between the rich and the 
poor in cities in which democratic and oligarchic partisans insists upon their different conceptions 
of justice to the exclusion or marginalization of each other.54 Indeed, Politics 5—Aristotle’s 
systematic analysis of faction—shows the practical ramifications of the oligarchic and democratic 
conceptions described in Politics 3: 
For democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking 
themselves to be unqualifiedly equal; for because they are equally free, they think 
they are unqualifiedly equal. Oligarchy, on the other hand, arose from those who 
are unequal in some respect taking themselves to be unqualifiedly unequal. The 
result is that the former claim to merit an equal share of everything, on the 
grounds that they are all equal, whereas the latter, being unequal, seek to get 
more (for a bigger share is an unequal one). All these constitutions possess justice 
of a sort, then, although unqualifiedly speaking they are mistaken. And this is why, 
when one or another of them does not participate in the constitution in 
accordance with their assumption, they start faction.55  
 
 
52 3.13.1283a31-33, 5.1.1301a31-35, 6.3.1318a21-25.  
53 4.5.1292a39-b3, 4.6.1293a12-25, 4.14.1298a35-40. 
54 Two recent volumes offer far more detailed accounts of this point than my chapter can explore. 
See E. Rogan, La Stásis dans la politique d’Aristote (Paris : Classiques Garnier, 2018) and S. 
Skultety, Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2019).  
55 5.1.1301a28-39 ; cf. 5.1.1301b26-39, 5.3.1303b3-6, 5.6.1305a42-45, 6.3.1318a17-22.  
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Democratic (and oligarchic) partisans are thus mistaken on two levels. First, unlike kingship, 
aristocracy, or polity, they ground claims to political participation on the basis of non-relevant 
criteria, namely on the basis of free-birth or wealth rather than on the basis of virtue, education, 
or ability.56 But secondly, on a more practical level, Aristotle faults democratic and oligarchic 
partisans because they fail to recognize that every city includes necessary parts, parts that their 
conceptions of justice exclude.57 Every coastal Greek city requires wealthy families whose 
liturgies pay for and outfit the triremes that ensure the safety of their commerce and the 
autonomy of their poleis. But every coastal Greek city also requires individuals who can serve as 
rowers in those triremes. Aristotle criticizes democratic (and oligarchic) notions of justice not 
only because of their mistaken conceptualization of equality and inequality but also because of 
the myopic or self-serving political activity the conceptions inspire. Democratic and oligarchic 
partisans are both factually and practically wrong because their “judgments concern themselves, 
and most people are pretty poor judges about what is their own.”58 
 
III.2 Democracy and the common good 
Oligarchic and democratic conceptions of justice elucidate Aristotle’s notion of the common good 
that distinguishes correct and deviant constitutional-types. According to Politics 3.6: 
It is evident, then, that those constitution-types that look to the common benefit 
turn out, according to what is unqualifiedly just, to be correct, whereas those 
which look only to the benefit of the rulers are mistaken and are deviations from 
 
56 For discussions of the “criterion problem,” see: 3.9.1281a2-7, 3.12.1282b26-1283a2, 
3.13.1283a30-39, 4.7.1293b7-20, 4.8.1294a9-25.  
57 For discussions of the “exclusion problem,” see: 3.9.1280a16-23, 3.13.1283a30-39, 
5.9.1309b18-1310a2.  
58 3.9.1280a13-15; Aristotle repeats the point at 3.13.1283a30, 3.16.1287a41-b3. 
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the correct constitutions. For they are like rule by a master, whereas a polis is a 
community of free people.59  
 
Immediately before articulating his distinction, Aristotle juxtaposes despotic or master rule from 
household rule.60 Whereas a master rules a slave for the master’s own benefit (even if that may 
involve beneficial treatment of a slave), a household head exercises rule for the benefit of the 
household. As a member of the household, the household head shares in the benefit of the 
household, but only indirectly and not exploitatively. The household head shares in his household 
community’s common good without selfishly seeking only his own good (but also without 
selflessly depriving himself of his community’s good).  
 Presumably the same model is at work in the distinction between correct and deviant 
constitution-types (for instance, between polity and democracy). The democratic partisan claims 
that it is just for the democracy to benefit the poor, even if it means exploiting the rich (for 
instance, through the redistribution of their property). But such justice is like the rule of a master 
who exploits the slave: although such acts are allegedly for the benefit of all, they are detrimental 
only to those who hold property and beneficial only to those who are poor. By contrast, in the 
constitution-type of polity, those in power rule in order to benefit those whom they rule, which 
incidentally includes themselves. To use a contemporary example: Raising property taxes to 
improve the schools in one’s town comes at a cost: Property owners (including those without 
school-age children) in the town will pay a higher tax bill. But the results of such a tax increase, 
 
59 3.6.1279a16-21. See further 3.12.1282b16-18, 3.13.1283b39-42, 3.17.1287b37-1288a1, 
4.10.1295a20-21.  
60 3.6.1278b15-1279a8. As Politics 3.6 notes, the differentiation of kinds of rule was the pre-
eminent subject of Politics Book 1 (e.g., 1.1.1252a7-17, 1.3.1253b15-20, 1.7.1255b11-20).  
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prudentially disbursed, will produce educated individuals whose education benefits all town-
members, even childless ones. A town needs first responders, nurses, doctors, and business 
owners, and those members of the community will perform their roles better if they are well-
educated. Thus, a town council that passes a property-tax increase to improve schools rules the 
town like a head of household rules the family, making decisions that promote the common good 
of the town. Democratic partisans fail to see (or fail to care) that their decisions benefit only 
themselves. Their myopia leads them to think that if property redistribution is beneficial to them, 
then it must be just, even if it is detrimental to property owners. Indeed, in the middle of 
Aristotle’s discussion of partisan notions of justice, he reproduces a short dialogue—not unlike a 
Platonic dialogue—that illustrates the antagonism between democratic and oligarchic partisans 
over such redistribution: 
Oligarchic: If the poor, because they are the greater number, divide up the 
property of the rich, isn’t that unjust? 
Democrat: No, by Zeus, it isn’t, since it seemed just to those in authority. 
Oligarch: If this is not extreme injustice, what is?61 
Aristotle ultimately evaluates the democratic conception of justice as the justification for a  
despotic rule or exploitation that benefits only the poor and not the community. Democracy as 
a constitution-type deviates from polity because it exploits community members and is 
unconcerned with the distribution of benefits and costs to the community as a whole.    
 
 
61 3.10.1281a14-20, with slight adaptation and insertion of roles (cf. 3.11.1281b18-20). I follow 
Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights, p. 281, in presenting this passage as a dialogue.  
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III.3 The constitutional stability of democracy  
Aristotle also evaluates constitution-types in terms of their stability (ἀσφαλής). No doubt, the 
evaluative categories of justice and stability overlap: Aristotle praises the Solonian practice of 
allowing the poor to elect and inspect officials precisely because “to give them no share and not 
to allow them to participate at all would be cause for alarm. For a state in which a large number 
of people are excluded from office and are poor must of necessity be full of enemies.”62 
Nonetheless, Aristotle recommends how to make an unjust constitution more stable.63 Aristotle’s 
political science includes the study of what preserves and destroys different constitution-types 
and constitutional stability is primarily a function of removing the destructive causes and 
establishing the preservative causes.64 Aristotle endorses two iterations of a general rule of 
stability: (1) For a constitution to endure, all parts of the polis must want the constitution to 
remain and (2) for a constitution to endure, the multitude that wants the constitution to remain 
must be larger than those that do not want it to remain.65 Simply because the multitude in 
democracies is generally in the majority (since in most constitutions, the poor outnumber the 
rich), Aristotle notes that democracy is a stable constitution-type.66 
 
62 3.11.1281b27-30. 
63 4.1.1288b30, 4.2.1289b23-26. 5.11 offers guidance to tyrants, 6.5 to democratic partisans, and 
6.6-7 to oligarchic partisans.  
64 4.1.1288b28-33, 4.2.1289b22-26, 5.1.1301a20-24, 6.5.1319b37-40. 
65 For rule (1), see 2.9.1270b20-22, 4.9.1294b34-40, 6.5.1320a14-17). For rule (2), see 
4.12.1296b14-16, 4.13.1297b4-6, 5.9.1309b16-18, 6.6.1320b26-28. 4.9.1294b37-38 seems to 
suggest that the rule (1) applies only to correct constitutions and rule (2) applies to both deviant 
and correction constitutions. Miller labels (1) the “maxim of unanimity” and (2) the “maxim of 
superiority,” (Nature, Justice and Rights, pp. 269-75, 285-93).  
66 4.11.1296a12-15, 5.1.1302a6-15; polity is also more stable than aristocracy for the same 
general reason (5.7.1307a15-19).  
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 Nonetheless, Aristotle recognizes that what one might call the “democratic ethos” is more 
than simply majority rule. In an extended reflection on how to preserve aristocracies and 
oligarchies, Aristotle claims that they ensure stability 
because those in office treat well both those outside the constitution (ἔξω τῆς 
πολιτείας) and those in the governing class. They do this by not being unjust to 
the nonparticipants and by bringing their leading men into the constitution; by not 
being unjust to those who love honor by depriving them of honor, or to the many 
by depriving them of profit; and by treating each other, the ones who do 
participate, in a democratic manner (δημοτικῶς). For what democrats seek to 
extend to the multitude, namely, equality, is not only just for those who are similar 
but also beneficial (συμφέρον). That is why, if the governing class is large, many 
democratic legislative measures prove beneficial.67  
 
Both to those included in and those excluded from a non-participatory constitution, there is a 
measure of democratic equality that is beneficial precisely because it is prudential or preservative 
of the constitution. Insofar as the constitution-type of democracy embodies a form of respect or 
inclusivity as such, the ethos of democracy is a salutary form of governing that Aristotle praises. 
 
III.4 The ranking of deviant constitutions 
In several places Aristotle ranks deviant constitution-types. According to his most comprehensive 
statement 
It is evident which of these deviations is worst and which second worst. For the 
deviation from the first and most divine constitution must of necessity be the 
worst….Hence tyranny, being the worst, is furthest removed from being a 
constitution; oligarchy is second worst (since aristocracy is very far removed from 
this constitution); and democracy the most moderate (μετριωτάτην).68  
 
A parallel passage in the Nicomachean Ethics helps unpack Aristotle’s reasoning: “democracy is 
 
67 5.8.1308a5-13.  
68 4.2.12489a38-b5. See also 3.17.1287b39-41, 4.8.1293b23-29.  
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the least bad of the deviations because it is only a very small deviation from the form of polity.”69 
Deviant constitution-types fall away from their correct archetypes, but the “fall” from polity to 
democracy is significantly less precipitous than the fall from kingship to tyranny or from 
aristocracy to oligarchy (Table III). Whereas the absolute king rules with a superhuman virtue,  
Table III: Right constitutions and their deviations with respect to virtue70 
Kingship: Rule of a person with super-human virtue 
 
Aristocracy: Rule of a small group or family of persons with human virtue 
 
Polity: Rule of a multitude with military/hoplite virtue 
 
Democracy: Rule of a multitude lacking military or civic virtue 
 
Oligarchy: Rule of a small group or family of persons on the basis of wealth 
 or lineage 
 
Tyranny: Rule of a person by means of force and injustice 
 
 
the tyrant rules with fear and terror. Although the spatial representation of Table III is imperfect, 
the Table illustrates Aristotle’s point: The gap between polity and democracy is significantly 
smaller than that between kingship and tyranny.  
 By contrast, a polity mixes well oligarchic and democratic features, whereas democracy 
 
69 EN 8.12.1160b20. 
70 Table III is inspired by Ober, Political Dissent, p. 311. Its textual basis for kingship virtue: 
3.13.1284a3-11, 1284b30-34, 3.17.1288a6-9, a14-29; for aristocratic virtue: 3.17.1288a9-13, 
4.7.293b2-11; for military virtue in a polity: 3.7.1279a36-b3, 3.17.1288a12-15; for basis of 
democracy and oligarchy ruling, see 4.12.11296b24-33; for the basis of tyranny ruling, see 
4.10.1295a18-23, 5.10.1311a23-31; cf. 5.11.1314a31-39. 
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is a more one-sided. 71 Consider the following comparison (Table III): 
Table IV: Polity and Democracy I 
 Sovereign part of the community  Institutional organization of the 
constitution 
Polity “Hoplite class” or middle class is 
sovereign.72 
Antagonism between rich and 
poor minimized due to presence of 
middle class. 
 
Rule according to law. 
Variable property requirements for office. 
Poor share in judiciary. 
Participation in the assembly based on 
minor property assessments; assembly 
meets infrequently and deliberates only 
on war/peace and inspection of 
magistrates.73 
Democracy I  Farmer class and class of those 
with moderate property are 
sovereign, but farming class 
participates rarely due to lack of 
leisure. 
Equality between rich and poor. 
Rule according to law. 
Offices open to all who meet minimal 
property qualifications. 
 
Comparison between polity and Democracy I is complicated because although Aristotle 
identifies different mixtures within a polity, he fails to identify species of polity (like he does with 
every other constitution-type). Nonetheless, the fall from polity to Democracy I is minimal and 
Democracy I is closer to polity than it is to Democracy IV. First, with respect to the sovereign part 
of the community: In both Democracy I and polity, a reliance upon a middle or moderate property 
owning class defuses antagonism between the rich and poor.74 Second, with respect to eligibility 
 
71 4.7.1293b31-35; 4.9.1294b13-15. Aristotle notes that historically polities used to be called 
democracies (4.13.1297b25) and that democracy is more like polity than any other deviation 
(5.1.1302a13-15). 
72 Hoplite class: 3.7.1279b4, 4.1297b1-2; middle class: 4.11.1295b34-37; rich and poor: 
4.11.1296a7-10. The “hoplite class” consists in those individuals who can afford heavy infantry 
armor and corresponds with Solon’s second lowest property classification. 
73 Property assessments for office: 4.9.1294b10-11; poor share in judiciary: 4.9.1294a36-42; 
assembly: 4.9.1294b1-5, 4.14.1298b4-10, 6.4.1319a32-35. 
74 4.4.1291b31-34, 4.6.1292b25-27.  
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to serve as a magistrate: In both Democracy I and polity, office is limited to those who meet 
specific property qualifications (similar to Solon’s limitation of office-holding to the first three 
property classes).75 Third, with respect to judiciary: in Democracy I and polity, all (including the 
poor) are eligible to serve in the courts (similar to Solon’s constitution).76 Fourth, with respect to 
the assembly: In both Democracy I and polity, members of the multitude are eligible to 
participate in the assembly, but it meets infrequently and/or the questions they can deliberate 
on are limited—and in the case of polity, most deliberation will concern inspection (like in 
Solonian democracy). Democracy I and polity share important constitutional features and are 
similar to Solon’s constitution. Aristotle provocatively, but enigmatically, claims that “only one 
man has ever been persuaded to introduce” the middle constitution, but he enigmatically fails to 




When we step back from Aristotle’s Politics or juxtapose it with the Athenian Constitution, 
democracy looks both familiar and unfamiliar. Familiar are the rich and nuanced details about 
how democracies (and oligarchies) experimented with different iterations and configurations of 
courts, magistrates, and deliberative assemblies. Less familiar, perhaps, is the diversity of 
 
75 4.4.1291b39-41, 4.6.1292b30-31, 6.4.1318b34-37; cf. 2.12.1274a19-21. 
76 2.12.1273b40-1274a3. 
77 4.1296a38-39. See A. Lintott, ‘Aristotle and Democracy’, Classical Quarterly 42 (1992), 126-
127; Hansen, ‘Solonian Democracy’, pp. 90-97; Papageorgiou, ‘Four or Five Types’, pp. 7-8. Ober, 
Political Dissent, p. 338, identifies Democracy I with the “ancestral democracy” described in 
Isocrates Areopagiticus (which is consistent with the Politics but not the Athenian Constitution). 
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democratic configurations that Aristotle presents to us—many of which look very different from 
Athenian democracy. 
 But to students of Athenian democracy (or even just the Athenian Constitution), 
Aristotle’s highly selective analysis of democratic leaders—such as Solon, Cleisthenes, or 
Pericles—is quite unfamiliar. On the one hand, Aristotle’s focus on the Solonic constitution re-
orients democracy as a constitution-type consistent with property qualifications and exclusion. 
On the other hand, Aristotle’s almost complete silence (at least in the Politics) about figures like 
Cleisthenes, Ephialtes, Pericles, or Thrasybulus does not accord with our leader-centric vision of 
the emergence of democracy in classical Athens. But if all we knew about the emergence or 
existence of democracy in classical Greece was Aristotle’s Politics, I suspect our vision of Greek 
democracy would be quite different. The contingent details of an Athens-centric path to 
democracy fades and the sheer variety of different kinds of democracies comes to light. Such is 
the vision of Aristotle’s πολιτικός. 
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